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"It is Much Easier to Find Fault With Others, Than
to be Faultless Ourselves": Contributory Negligence
as a Bar to a Claim for Breach of the Implied
Warranty of Merchantability
WILLIAM B. L. LITTLE,J.D., LL.M.*
INTRODUCTION

A warranty claim, expressed or implied, is grounded in contract
law.2 As Justice Bobbit stated in Wyatt v. North Carolina Equipment
Co., "[w]hether considered collateral thereto or an integral part
'3
thereof, a warranty is an element of a contract of sale."
Negligence actions are, of course, based in tort jurisprudence and
are not contractual in nature.4 An elegantly simple differentiation
* William B. L. Little, Esq. is a partner of Little & Little, PLLC, a Raleigh, North
Carolina law firm. Mr. Little received his LL.M. With Distinction from the Georgetown
University Law Center in its Securities and Financial Regulation graduate program.
Prior to receiving his Juris Doctor, cum laude, at Campbell University School of Law,
Mr. Little was a Series 7 licensed registered representative with Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc. and other major broker-dealers. For over a decade, Mr. Little has
concentrated his legal practice in the area of securities arbitration and litigation.
1. "It is much easier to find fault with others, than to be faultless ourselves." THE
COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (Robert Andrew et al. eds., 1996), available at http:/
/www.bartleby.com/66/16/46516.htm
(attributed to Samuel Richardson
(1689-1761), British novelist).
2. Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 854 (N.C. 1988) ("A warranty,
express or implied, is contractual in nature.") (citing Wyatt v. N.C. Equip. Co., 117
S.E.2d 21, 24 (N.C. 1960)); see also Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 355 S.E.2d
189, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("The action for a rent abatement for breach of an
implied warranty is wholly contractual."); Spillman v. American Homes of Mocksville,
Inc., 422 S.E.2d 740, 741 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) ("Absent the existence of a public
policy exception, as in the case of contracts involving a common carrier, innkeeper or
other bailee, a tort action does not lie against a party to a contract who simply fails to
properly perform the terms of the contract, even if that failure to properly perform was
due to the negligent or intentional conduct of that party, when the injury resulting
from the breach is damage to the subject matter of the contract.") (citing N.C. State
Ports Auth. v. L. A. Roofing Co., 240 S.E.2d 345, 350-51 (N.C. 1978), overruled in part
by Trs. of Rowan Technical Coll. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assoc., 328 S.E.2d 274 (N.C.
1985)).
3. 117 S.E.2d at 24.
4. Bowen v. Mewborn, 11 S.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.C. 1940) ("Actionable negligence
in the law of torts is a breach of some duty imposed by law or a want of due
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between tort and contract law was stated by Chief Judge Hedrick in
Labarre v. Duke University:
"[A]n action in tort must [ordinarily] be grounded on a violation
of a duty imposed by operation of law, and the right invaded must be
one that the law provides without regard to the contractual relationship of the parties, rather than one based on an agreement between the
parties." Moreover, "[a] tort action does not lie against a promisor 'for
his simple failure to perform his contract, even though such failure was
due to negligence or lack of skill." 5
A claim alleging the breach of a warranty does not immediately
bring to mind the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.6
Moreover, the vast majority of jurisdictions hold that the doctrine of
contributory negligence is not a defense, affirmative or otherwise,
against an injured party who seeks to recover upon a breach of an
implied warranty of a good or product that allegedly caused injury to a
person or property.7 Notwithstanding instincts regarding the contractual nature of warranty claims, North Carolina counsel should look to
avail themselves of this familiar arrow 8 from his or her quiver in order
care?commensurate care under the circumstances? which proximately results in injury
to another.") (citing State v. Cope, 167 S.E.2d 456, 457 (N.C. 1933)).
5. 393 S.E.2d 321, 324 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Asheville Contracting Co. v.
City of Wilson, 303 S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Holland v. Edgerton, 355
S.E.2d 514, 518 (N.C. Ct. App.1987)).
6. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 840 (2007) ("Ordinarily, the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff ... does not preclude his or her recovery for a breach of
contract by the defendant, although the negligence of the plaintiff may be a material
consideration in fixing the amount of the damages to be recovered by him or her.")
(citing 17A AM. JUR. 2D, Contracts § 627 (2007)).
7. See J. Stanley McQuade, Products Liability - Emerging Consensus and Persisting
Problems: An Analytical Review PresentingSome Options, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 55-56
(2002) ("1. Contributory Negligence. An objective standard is used: what a reasonable
person with the knowledge and experience of the plaintiff would do to protect
themselves under the circumstances ....
In the tiny minority of states that retain the
contributory negligence doctrine (including North Carolina) user negligence is a
complete defense, totally barring recovery.") (emphasis added); see also 57B AM. JUR.
2D Negligence § 840 (2007) ("[Wlhere a plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries
sustained by reason of a breach of an implied warranty for fitness for use of an article
which is a dangerous instrumentality, contributory negligence is not a defense where
it serves simply to put the warranty to the test.") (citing Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d
149 (9th Cir. 1962)).
8. See Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 467 S.E.2d 58, 65 (N.C.
1996), abrogated by Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882 (N.C. 1998) ("A plaintiff is
contributorily negligent when he fails to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under the circumstances in order to avoid injury.")
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to bar a plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.
Under North Carolina law, it is well-settled, albeit perhaps not
well-recognized, that an action arising under § 25-2-314 for the breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability may be barred under
§ 99B-4 of the North Carolina Products Liability Act 9 (Chapter 99B) by
the plaintiff's contributory negligence.10 Specifically, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that this affirmative defense is available
when the claim asserting the breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability alleges injury or damage to person or property caused
by the non-merchantable good.'1
The statutory and common law framework involved in the assertion of this archetypical affirmative tort defense involves the interplay
between Chapter 99B, North Carolina's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,' 2 and the State's long-standing affinity for the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence.
To better understand the policy underpinnings of the statutory
bar of certain implied warranty merchantability claims, this Article
first reviews the origins and the continued vibrancy of the doctrine of
contributory negligence in North Carolina. The doctrine is then
examined in the context of North Carolina's enactment of the Products
Liability Act and the doctrine's applicability to the implied warranty of
merchantability.
NORTH CAROLINA'S CONTINUED EMBRACE OF THE COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

North Carolina is known by many as the Tar Heel State. According to one source, this moniker's origin putatively relates to soldiers
from North Carolina holding their ground in battle when all others
had fled in retreat.' 3 Perhaps this indigenous stubborn streak helps to
explain why North Carolina is one of only five jurisdictions that con9. 9 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -11 (2005).
10. See Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1997).
11. See id. ("We have said that N.C.G.S. § 99B-4(1), (3) [of Chapter 99B] 'merely
codify the common law doctrine of contributory negligence' as it applies in products
liability actions.") (citing Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., 406
S.E.2d 856, 860 (N.C. 1991)).

12. See N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 25-1 to -11 (2005).

13. Tar Heel Traditions, http://www.unc.edu/about/traditions.html
Oct. 2, 2007).
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tinue to adhere to the doctrine of contributory negligence.1 4 Further
explanation is provided by one commentator as follows: "Some suggested reasons for these states' continued adherence to the archaic doctrine of contributory negligence include the fact that most of these
states are located in an area of the country where tradition dies hard
and a possible legislative intent to preserve a climate favorable to
industry. ''1 5
This intransigence on the part of the North Carolina Legislature
and the Appellate Court ? the staunch refusal to both disavow the doctrine of contributory negligence and opt for the path of forty-six other
states who have adopted comparative negligence' 6 ? has engendered
some harsh criticism. One commentator states that the "nearly universal" primary disparagement concerning the contributory negligence
doctrine is that it is "inherently unfair" and that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to find an advocate in either current case law or academic
scholarship. 17

What has engendered this criticism? In Godwin v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., the North Carolina Supreme Court stated the following
regarding the doctrine of contributory negligence:
It is the prevailing and permissible rule of practice to enter judgment of
nonsuit in a negligence case, when it appears from the evidence offered
14. The jurisdictions which still retain the doctrine of contributory negligence are
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. See
Berbog v. Scrushy, 855 So. 2d 523, 531 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) ("Contributory
negligence is an affirmative and complete defense to a claim based on negligence.")
(citing Ridgeway v. CSX Transp. Inc., 723 So. 2d 600, 606 (Ala. 1998)); Abraham v.
Moler, 252 A.2d 68, 70 (Md. 1969) ("Contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense which was available to appellants and they had the burden of proving not only
that a reasonably prudent person would, in the circumstances, have taken precautions
but also that [the plaintiff] failed to take those precautions and that her failure so to do
directly contributed to her injury."); Estate of Moses v. Sw. Va. Transit Mgmt. Co. (643
S.E.2d 156, 159 (Va. 2007) ("Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense that
must be proved according to an objective standard whether the plaintiff failed to act as
a reasonable person would have acted for his own safety under the circumstances.")
(citing Jenkins v. Pyles, 611 S.E.2d 404, 407 (Va. 2005)); Wingfield v. Peoples Drug
Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 1977) ("The rule is simply that contributory
negligence bars a plaintiffs recovery."). Whether based upon a pure or a modified
comparative fault, the remaining forty-six states have adopted some form of
comparative negligence.
15. Alison P. Raney, Note, Stacy v. Jedco Construction, Inc.: North CarolinaAdopts
a Diminished Capacity Standard for Contributory Negligence, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1215, 1218 n.42 (1996).
16. Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare
Decisis in North Carolina, 18 Campbell L. Rev. 1, 2 (1996).
17. Id. at 25.
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on behalf of the plaintiff that his own negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury or one of them. The plaintiff thus proves himself
out of court. It need not appear that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury as this would exclude any idea of negligence
on the part of the defendant. It is enough if it contributes to the injury.
The very term "contributory negligence" ex vi termini implies that it
need not be the sole cause of the injury. The plaintiff may not recover,
in an action like the present, when his negligence concurs with the
negligence of the defendant in proximately producing the injury. 8
The common argument against the doctrine of contributory negligence is that a plaintiff is barred from recovery "even if the plaintiffs
fault is very small and the defendant's fault is very large. It is an all-ornothing proposition ... ."19 Thus, theoretically, even if the jury finds
that the plaintiff was only 1% at fault and the defendant 99% at fault,
the severely injured plaintiff recovers nothing, regardless of the
grievousness of his or her injury.2 °
While the issue of negligence, both plaintiffs and defendant's, is
customarily the province of the jury, courts will on occasion decide
the issue as a matter of law, although one commentator states that
there is an "appropriate reluctance" by North Carolina courts to take
the issue from the jury.21 Judicial reluctance notwithstanding, this
18. Godwin v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 17 S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (N.C. 1941) (citing
Battle v. Cleave, 101 S.E. 555 (N.C. 1919); Wright v. S. R.R., 71 S.E. 306 (N.C. 1911);
Beck v. Hooks, 10 S.E.2d 608 (N.C. 1940); Horne v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 87 S.E. 523
(N.C. 1916); Absher v. City of Raleigh, 190 S.E. 897 (N.C. 1937); Wright v. D. Pender
Grocery Co., 187 S.E. 564 (N.C. 1936); Fulcher v. Pine Lumber Co., 132 S.E. 9 (N.C.
1926); W. Constr. Co. v. At. Coast Line R.R., 113 S.E. 672 (N.C. 1922)).
19. Gardner, supra note 13, at 2.
20. See Raney, supra note 12, at 1220.
21. Gardner, supra note 13, at 18, 22 ("Beginning in the mid-1950s ? and
continuing through today ? the supreme court (sic) backed away from its previously
aggressive and expansive view of contributory negligence as a matter of law.") (citing
in part Dennis v. City of Albermarle, 87 S.E.2d 561 (N.C. 1955); Miller v. Miller, 160
S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968)). Mr. Gardner cited the following from Taylor v. Walker as
representing the Supreme Court's "modern" view concerning the judiciary finding
contributory negligence as a matter of law:
Only in exceptional cases is it proper to enter a directed verdict or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict against a plaintiff in a negligence case. Issues
arising in negligence cases are ordinarily not susceptible of summary
adjudication because application of the prudent man test, or any other
applicable standard of care, is generally for the jury. Greater judicial caution
is therefore called for in actions alleging negligence as a basis for plaintiff's
recovery or, in the alternative, asserting contributory negligence as a bar to
that recovery.
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affirmative defense is a common defense in North Carolina concerning negligence actions.2 2
Contributory negligence dominated American jurisprudence for
much of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century.2 3 For the
past 138 years the following admonition by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, as stated in the State's seminal case concerning the
doctrine of contributory negligence, Morrison v. Cornelius,24 has provided guidance for the courts and practitioners alike: "Let us see if the
plaintiff was guilty of no act of omission or commission, which contributed to his misfortune. 2 5 Given North Carolina's continued adherence to the contributory negligence doctrine, a review of the doctrine's
early development, policy justifications, and foundational logic is
appropriate.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Negligence, as an independent action, began to take hold in the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It is not surprising that the
concept of a plaintiff's negligence acting as a bar to his or her recovery
for damages suffered by the negligent actions of others formally
arrived on the scene in the early nineteenth century. The 1809 English
case of Butterfield v. Forresteris generally credited as the first decision
to recognize contributory negligence. 6 Despite the near universal
acknowledgement of Butterfield's pedigree, the origins of the concepts
Taylor v. Walker, 360 S.E.2d 796 (N.C. 1987). However, North Carolina appellate
courts still exercise their prerogative regarding holding a plaintiff contributorily
negligent as a matter of law with some frequency where appropriate. See e.g.
Thornton v. F.J. Cherry Hosp., 644 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (holding plaintiff,
an involuntarily committed patient at a North Carolina mental hospital, to be
contributorily negligent so as to preclude his recovery under the North Carolina Tort
Claims Act for injuries suffered after plaintiff provoked a physical altercation with
other patients); Seay v. Snyder, 638 S.E.2d 584 (N.C.Ct. App. 2007) (holding there
was sufficient evidence at trial to support a jury instruction on plaintiffs contributory
negligence); TAYLOR V. COATS, 636 S.E.2d 581 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding plaintiff
was contributorily negligent for riding in a car in which plaintiff knew, or should have
known, that the driver was intoxicated).
22. See Lucinda L. Fraley, Note, The Evolution and Status of the Contributory
Negligence Defense to Medical MalpracticeActions in North Carolina - McGill v. French,
16 Campbell L. Rev. 103, 109 (1994).
23. See Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L. J. 691, 691-92
(1940).
24. 63 N.C. 346 (1869).
25. Id. at 351.
26. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), available at http://books.google.
com/books?id=DGkyAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA189&dq=butterfield+v+forrester&ie=ISO-
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underlying the contributory negligence doctrine actually pre-date this
1809 King's Bench decision.2 7
In Butterfield, the facts disclose that the defendant:
[F]or the purposes of making some repairs to his house, which was

close by the road side at one end of the town, had put up a pole across
this part of the road, a free passage being left by another branch or
street in the same direction. That the plaintiff left a public house not
far distant from the place in question at 8 o'clock in the evening in
August, when they were just beginning to light candles, but while there
was light enough left to discern the obstruction at 100 yards distance:
and the witness, who proved this, said that if the plaintiff had not been
8859-1;James, supra note 20; Fraley, supra note 19, at 108; Gardner, supra note 13, at
5; Raney, supra note 12, at 1219.
27. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 442 (Fla. 1973) (abrogating the doctrine
of comparative negligence in favor of comparative fault) (Roberts, J., dissenting):
Although the case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng.Rep.

926 (K.B.1809), is recognized as a leading case in the area of contributory
negligence, such case was not the first pronouncement of the common law
doctrine of contributory negligence. Lord Ellenborough wrote in Butterfield
v. Forrester, supra,
"One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using
ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an
obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." 11 East 60, 61.
The brief opinions of Bayley, J. and Lord Ellenborough in [Butterfield v.]
Forrester were merely a restatement of the concept of common law
contributory negligence ....
I note with much interest the comment by Wex S. Malone in, 'The
Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,' 41 Illinois Law Review, 151, to
the following effect: "The concise opinions of Bayley and Lord Ellenborough
in Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) afford no indication that either of those
judges felt at the time that he was charting new paths for law."
Contributory negligence was adopted much earlier as a part of the
common law. In Bayly v. Merrell, Cro.Jac. 386, 79 Eng.Rep. 331 (1606), the

Court explicated,
"(I)f he doubted of the weight thereof, he might have weighed it; and was
not bound to give credence to another's speech; and being his own negligence,
he is without remedy." (Emphasis supplied) Crojac. 386, p. 387, 79 Eng.Rep.
331.
Charles Beach in 1882 traced the doctrine of contributory negligence
back to its origin in his treatise on contributory negligence, wherein he set

out,

"Our Anglo-American law of Negligence, including, as of course, that of
Contributory Negligence, has come down to us, in ordinary generation, from
the civil law of imperial Rome. It is a part of that great debt which the
common law owes to the classical and the scholastic jurisprudence."
(citations omitted).
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riding very hard he might have observed and avoided it: the plaintiff
however, who was riding violently, did not observe it, but rode against
it, and fell with his horse and was much hurt in consequence of the
accident; and there was no evidence of his being intoxicated at the
time. On this evidence Bayley, J. directed the jury, that if a person
riding with reasonable and ordinary care could have seen and avoided
the obstruction, and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff was riding
along the street extremely hard, and without ordinary care, they should
find a verdict for the defendant: which they accordingly did.28
The plaintiff moved for a new trial, citing the following rule in
Buller's Law of Nisi Prius: "'[I]f a man lay logs of wood across a highway; though a person may with care ride safely by, yet if by means
thereof my horse stumble and fling me, I may bring an action.'"29
Chief Judge Lord Ellenborough denied the plaintiffs motion, and
provided the basic framework for modern contributory negligence by
opining:
A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by
the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do [sic] not himself use
common and ordinary caution to be in the right. In cases of persons
riding upon what is considered to be the wrong side of the road, that
would not authorize another purposely to ride up against them. One
person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary
care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an
obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.30
Modern contributory negligence doctrine states that a finding of
contributory negligence necessarily requires that both the plaintiff and
the defendant be at fault in both proximately causing the injury. 3 ' The
North Carolina Supreme Court stated the obvious in West Construction
Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. 32 :
Contributory negligence, as understood and used in legal parlance, is
such an act or omission on the part of a plaintiff, amounting to a want
of due care, as, concurring and co-operating with the negligent act of
the defendant, is a proximate cause or occasion of the injury sustained. Two elements, at least, are necessary to constitute contributory
negligence: (1) A want of due care on the part of the plaintiff; and (2) a
proximate connection between the plaintiffs negligence and the injury.
These are the vital questions to be determined upon the issue of con28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

11 East at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. (emphasis added).
Gardner, supra note 13, at 62.
113 S.E. 672 (1922).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss1/8

8

Little: "It Is Much Easier to Find Fault with Others, Than to be Faultles

2007]

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY

tributory negligence. There must be not only negligence on the part of
the plaintiff, but contributory negligence, a real causal connection
between the plaintiff's negligent act and the injury, or it is no defense
to the action ....
If the plaintiff's negligence be the sole and only cause of the injury,
it would not be contributory negligence at all, but rather the source of
33
a self-inflicted injury.
...

It should be noted that Judge Bayley posited in Butterfield that the
plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident when he stated
that:
The plaintiff was proved to be riding as fast as his horse could go, and
this was through the streets of Derby. If he had used ordinary care he
must have seen the obstruction; so that the accident appeared to happen
entirely from his own fault.3 4
Thus, supreme irony finds that Butterfield, while "set[ting] the
stage for a litigation revolution, 3 5 was in actuality a case involving a
horseman whose actions at dusk were the sole proximate cause of selfinflicted injury.
Nonetheless, the rule cited to by the plaintiff in Butterfield, "'if a
man lay logs of wood across a highway,"' 36 was eventually annotated
in the seventh edition of Sir Francis Buller's An Introduction to The Law
Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius with the following: "To support this
action, two things must concur, an obstruction on the road by the fault
of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on plaintiff's
part. Per Lord Ellenborough, CJ. in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East,
60. 37

By 1824 the contributory negligence doctrine entered into American jurisprudence via a Massachusetts case, Smith v. Smith.3 8 As one
commentator states, "almost from the very beginning there has been
serious dissatisfaction with the Draconian rule sired by a medieval

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 673 (citation omitted).
11 East at 61 (emphasis added).
Fraley, supra note 19, at 108.
11 East at 61; Raney supra note 12, at 1220.
SIR FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT

Nisi

PRIus, 26(a) n.a (Richard W. Bridgean 7th ed. 1817) (1806), available at http://books.

google.com/books?id=aJEDAAAAQAAJ&pg=RA1-PA l&dq=An+Introduction+to+The+
Law+Relative+to+Trials+at+Nisi+Prius&ie=ISO-8859-1#PRA1-PA26,M1.
38. Gardner, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621 (1824)).
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concept of cause, out of a heartless laissez-faire.
40

' 39

The doctrine soon

"became a tenet of American tort law."

II.

NORTH CAROLINA'S ADOPTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

North Carolina first recognized, via dicta, the contributory negligence doctrine in the 1849 case of Herring v. Wilmington & Raleigh
Railroad Co., and would eventually apply it in the 1869 case of Morrison v. Cornelius.4"
Commentators have discussed various reasons why the contributory negligence doctrine gained relatively rapid acceptance in nineteenth century American jurisprudence, including: a policy intent to
limit liability to the rapidly burgeoning industrial base of the United
States, and in particular the railroad industry; 4 2 a "distrust of plaintiffsympathetic juries;"4 3 an alleged inability to apportion fault amongst
the plaintiff and defendant;4 4 an inclination by the judiciary to seek a
39. James, supra note 20, at 704.
40. Raney, supra note 12, at 1219.
41. Gardner, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Herring v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R. Co.,
32 N.C. 402 (1849); Morrison v. Cornelius, 63 N.C. 346 (1869)).
42. See Raney, supra note 12, at 1223, (citing James L. Hunt, Note, PrivateLaw and
Public Policy: Negligence Law and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century North
Carolina, 66 N.C. L. REV. 421, 426 (1988) (proposing that economic considerations
concerning the railroad industry in the State drove North Carolina's acceptance of the
doctrine of contributory negligence); see also Gardner, supra note 13, at 11-12
(dismissing any overt railroad industry bias by the courts as being unsubstantiated).
Mr. Gardner states:
Several commentators attribute the United States' quick acceptance of the
contributory negligence doctrine on courts' alleged desire to aid the
industrial revolution, particularly railroads ....

Nearly all of the published

nineteenth-century negligence cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court that discuss the contributory negligence doctrine involve a railroad.
43. Fraley, supra note 19, at 109; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
AMERICAN LAW 353 (3rd ed. 2005).
[Contributory Negligence] became a favorite method through which judges
kept tort claims away from the jury. The trouble with the jury (people
thought) was they always decided for the plaintiff, in pitiful cases where
crippled men sued big corporations. Even people who respect general rules
find it hard to resist from bending them once in a while, especially if the
victim hauls his battered body into the courtroom, or a widow or orphans
stare into a jury box ....

OF

But if plaintiff was clearly negligent himself, there

could be no recovery; there would be no facts to be found, and a judge might
take the case from the jury and dismiss it.
44. See James, supra note 20, at 694 and Fraley, supra note 19, at 109.
Another factor which may have contributed to the all-or-nothing form of the
rule was the nearly complete lack of precedent for any alternative solution,
except perhaps in maritime law. It is probable that neither ancient law nor
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single cause for injury; 45 that the doctrine is simply "an aspect of
assumption of risk" and its application deters careless conduct; 46 and

that the doctrine "serves a penal function as it denies recovery to the
plaintiff due to his own lack of due care. 4 7
48
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Morrison v. Cornelius
stated the basic rule which has continued to embody the heart of the
doctrine of contributory negligence in North Carolina today:
In all cases where a person, in the lawful use of his own property,
causes injury to another, the party injured, before he can recover damages at law, must show that he has exercised proper care, and is free
from blame in regard to the matter. If it appears that the party injured
has, by any act of omission or commission on his part, contributed to
the injury complained of, it is generally damnum absque injuria.4 9

A.

North Carolina'sIntent to be Last Man Standing

Perhaps in response to the commentary regarding the alleged
unfairness of the contributory negligence doctrine in its initially
unadulterated King's Bench form, both the North Carolina General
Assembly and the Supreme Court have over time enacted laws and rendered decisions which have taken the edge off of the harsher aspects of
the doctrine. These efforts have included: (1) placing the burden of
pleading and proving the plaintiffs contributory negligence upon the
defendant; ° (2) promulgating the last clear chance doctrine which
allows the plaintiff to assert that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the impending peril to the plaintiff and had an opportunity to avoid the injury to the plaintiff but unreasonably did not do
so; 5 ' (3) holding that willful and wanton conduct by the defendant
denies him or her the defense of contributory negligence;5 2 (4) adopting the rescue doctrine which generally excludes the contributory negcontemporaneous continental European law had developed any well defined
procedure for dividing or apportioning loss in these situations.
45. Raney, supra note 12, at 1219 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 452 (5th ed. 1984)).
46. James, supra note 20, at 698.
47. Fraley, supra note 19, at 109-10.
48. 63 N.C. 346.
49. Id. at 348-49; see also Thomason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 55 S.E. 205, (1906)
("[T]he maxim 'damnum absque injuria,'... 'is used to designate damage which is not
occasioned by anything which the law esteems an injury."').
50. Act of Jan. 26, 1887, ch. 33, § 1, 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws 81; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-

139 (2005).
51. See Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N.C. 310 (1881).
52. See Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N.C. 474 (1899).
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ligence doctrine for suits by plaintiffs attempting a rescue; 5 3 (5) that
minors of certain ages either did not have the capacity to act with negligence or that such was a rebuttable presumption; 54 (6) holding that
the contributory negligence of a person of diminished capacity must
be determined pursuant to a subjective standard of someone of like
mental capacity; 55 and (7) the general abrogation by the North Caro-

lina General Assembly of tort law as it relates to claims by employees
injured in a work-related accident via the Workers' Compensation
Act.

56

Moreover, the doctrine of contributory negligence is not without
its defenders.5 7 One commentator argues that North Carolina is more
conservative than most jurisdictions in its tort jurisprudence. 58 He
buttressed this opinion, in part, with North Carolina's continued application of the contributory negligence doctrine as the method for
apportioning tort liability, "despite intense pressure in recent years for
its rejection. '59 The contributory negligence doctrine, asserts the commentator, along with statutory measures concerning the North Carolina Products Liability Act, evidences that "North Carolina has taken a
common sense approach to tort recovery keeping in mind the costs of
running businesses, manufacturing products, and providing services
to its citizens.6 °
Another commentator asserts that there are "valid policy reasons"
for the past opposition to legislative proposals which would replace
contributory negligence in North Carolina with comparative fault.6 1
The commentator argues numerous and substantial grounds for the
General Assembly's past rejection of comparative fault legislation,
including, but not limited to: concerns that the adoption of comparative fault would substantially increase premiums; that the often cited
one percent negligent plaintiff being denied any recovery is in actuality
a "strawman" in that such an outcome is only hypothetical or, "at
most, anecdotal" given that cases which are privately settled between
53. See Gardner, supra note 13, at 24-25.
54. Id. at 24.

55. See Stacy v. Jedco Constr., Inc., 119 N.C. App. 115, disc. rev. denied, 341 N.C.
421 (1995); see also Raney, supra note 12.
56. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 97 §§ 97-1 to 97-101.
57. See e.g. John P. Marshall, The Battle at Little Big Horn has Moved to Raleigh - Is
this Custer's Last Stand Against Tort Reform?, 10 Campbell L. Rev. 439, 443-44 (1988).
58. Id. at 443.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Richard T. Boyette, A Case Against Comparative Negligence, N.C. ST. B.Q., Fall
1991, at 22.
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the parties many times arrive at a payment amount which has been
adjusted downward by an analysis approximating comparative fault
performed by the parties' respective counsel; and the fact that there are
numerous substantive safeguards, such as placing the burden of proof
on the contributory issue upon the defendant, the "last clear chance"
doctrine, and contributory negligence not being a defense for a defendant's gross or willful and wanton conduct.6 2
Lastly, there is a viewpoint amongst lawyers, many practicing in
North Carolina, that juries understand the "all or nothing" nature
associated with the contributory negligence doctrine and therefore at
times see fit not to find the plaintiff contributorily negligent even
where appropriate. Instead such juries, acting in a manner commonly
referred to as "rough justice," will equitably split the baby between the
plaintiffs and defendant's respective faults by awarding the plaintiff
diminished damages through the application of a de facto comparative
fault rationale.6 3
B.

The General Assembly and the Doctrine of ContributoryNegligence

For the past forty years the prevailing trend of other jurisdictions
has been the abrogation of the doctrine of contributory negligence,
either by legislation or judicial fiat, in favor of the comparative fault
scheme.6 4 Proponents of the comparative negligence doctrine have
made repeated legislative attempts in the North Carolina General
Assembly to abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence in North
Carolina in favor of comparative

fault.65

As to the relationship

between contributory and comparative negligence, 57B AM.
Negligence states:

JUR. 2D

62. Id.
63. See Gardner, supra note 13, at 30-31; see also Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1973):
Those who defend the doctrine of contributory negligence argue that the rule
is also not as harsh in its practical effect as it is in theory. This is so, they say,
because juries tend to disregard the instructions given by the trial judge in an
effort to afford some measure of rough justice to the injured party.
Id. at 437.
64. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 801 n.1 (2004) ("Between 1920 and 1969, a
few states began utilizing the principles of comparative fault in all tort litigation.
Then, between 1969 and 1984, comparative fault replaced contributory negligence in
37 additional states." (quoting McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992))).
65. See Raney, supra note 12, at 1224 ("[I]n the late 1980s and early 1990s, activity
in the state legislature indicated some legislators' willingness to consider major
changes to the negligence scheme.").
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The concepts of contributory negligence and comparative negligence
both apportion fault in accordance with the plaintiffs and defendant's
negligence and affect the plaintiffs entitlement to damages, although
the law of contributory negligence generally addresses the effect of the
plaintiffs fault, if any, on the plaintiffs entitlement to recover damages
at all, whereas the doctrine of comparative negligence considers those
circumstances under which the plaintiff's contributory fault does not
bar recovery, but does serve to reduce the damages he or she would
otherwise be entitled to receive. 66

In 1933 a bill providing for the abrogation of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence was first introduced in the
North Carolina House of Representatives of the General Assembly but
was never addressed by the full House. 67 The issue lay dormant until
1953 and 1957, when bills providing for comparative negligence were
introduced but eventually failed. 68 The 1970s saw bills introduced but
not being enacted in 1973, 1977, and 1979.69 Repeated attempts in
1981, 1983, 1985, and 1987 were again denied passage. 7 ° More recent
attempts have been made in the 1990s and this century but without
success and it appears that the attempt in the current legislative session in 2007 has failed as well. 7 '
While some of these bills came within a few votes of passage, a
combination of factors caused the efforts to be for naught. 72 Perhaps
most important of these was the concern by lawmakers that liability
insurance rates would escalate if the contributory negligence doctrine
were abrogated in favor of comparative negligence.7 3 Although this
contention was much debated, a set of empirical studies showing a
dramatic increase in insurance rates for those jurisdictions that have
66. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 804 (2004).

67. Gardner, supra note 13, at 38.
68. Id. at 39.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 40-47.
71. The General Assembly's most recent attempt to end contributory negligence
with a comparative fault substitute has come in the 2007 Session during which House
Bill 1571 was filed on April 17, 2007 (House Bill 1571 "Uniform Apportionment of
Tort Responsibility"). However, the bill has since been revised to now simply
authorize the Legislative Research Commission to study the doctrine of contributory
negligence and to consider whether it should be replaced by comparative negligence or
some other scheme for determining tort liability, and to also consider joint and several
liability. The bill presently sits in the Committee on Rules, Calendar, and Operations
of the House.
72. Gardner, supra note 13, at 39.
73. Id. at 47-48.
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adopted comparative negligence appeared to provide substantial foun74
dation for such belief.
At times it was argued that these proposed bills were simply
intended to increase revenues for attorneys.75 The now centuries old
sentiment that a plaintiff should not benefit by his or her own negligence was again expressed. 76 Legislators even considered the abolishment of joint and several liability in the hope of attaining passage of a
comparative negligence bill, but to no avail. 77
Thus, after repeated attempts over the years the North Carolina
General Assembly has not enacted a bill requiring that comparative
negligence be the method for determining tort liability. Instead, as will
be discussed below, the North Carolina General Assembly has, by relatively recent legislative action, reaffirmed the State's commitment to the
doctrine of contributory negligence.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE NORTH
CAROLINA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT

Contemporary products liability jurisprudence is a relative newcomer to legal jurisprudence, with the first landmark decision being
rendered in the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 78 Subse-

quently, little change in the law occurred until the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s during which the law witnessed both "radical changes" in
the development of products liability litigation, including the adoption
by the vast majority of jurisdictions of the strict liability doctrine,7 9
and plaintiffs winning larger recoveries with greater ease. 80
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO THE NORTH CAROLINA

PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT

In the years preceding the acceptance of the strict liability doctrine in products liability actions, plaintiffs typically pled claims based
74. Id.
75. Id. at 40-41.

76. Id. at 42-43.
77. Id. at 45-46.
78. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); McQuade, supra note 7, at 4.
79. See Charles F. Blanchard & Doug B. Abrams, North Carolina's New Products
Liability Act: A CriticalAnalysis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 185 (1980) (noting that,
by 1980, all but approximately six jurisdictions had adopted the strict liability
doctrine).
80. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 4; see also Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The
Evolution of Useful Life Statutes in the Products Liability Reform Effort, 1989 DUKE LJ.
1689, 1689 (1990).
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in negligence and breach of warranty theory.8 ' However, the requirements of privity and proof of negligent manufacture produced sizeable
roadblocks for an injured party to recover for damages caused by a
defective product.8 2
For years, the archetypical defense to a products liability action
grounded in either negligence or warranty theory was that the original
purchaser lacked privity with the manufacturer and distributor, and
that a secondary purchaser lacked privity with the manufacturer, distributor, and retailer.8 3
The view that there had to exist a duty
between plaintiff and defendant, whether the action lay in tort or warranty, before the defendant could recover derived from the 1847
English case of Winterbottom v. Wright.8 4
Another obstacle to an injured party's recovery for his or her injuries in a products liability case was the requirement that the plaintiff
prove that the product was negligently manufactured; such an evidentiary showing is considered quite difficult given modern production
systems. 8 5 Particular issues of whether proper safety measures would
have revealed the defect, or that the defect was even caused by the
defendant's actions, proved thorny for many plaintiffs seeking recovery
for their injuries."
A.

The Pendulum Swings: Leveling the Playing Field Between
Consumer and Manufacturer

Not unlike the judiciary's past attempts to ameliorate the more
severe aspects of contributory negligence via such devices as the last
clear chance doctrine, courts proceeded to gradually relax certain privity and evidentiary impediments to recovery so that manufacturers
could not blithely introduce defective and dangerous products into the
87
stream of commerce in an atmosphere of limited liability.
For example, juries were enabled by the use of res ipsa loquitur to
presume negligence via the mere existence of an accident or injury. 88
81. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1693.
82. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 10-12.
83. See Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 177-78.
84. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); see also McQuade, supra note 7, at 10-11.
85. McQuade, supra note 7, at 12.
86. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1693.
87. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 10-12.
88. See Cockerham v. Ward, 262 S.E.2d 651, 656 (1980) ("It is well settled that
negligence is never presumed from the mere fact that an accident or injury has
occurred, except in the narrow class of cases to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable."); see also Page v. Sloan, 183 S.E.2d 813 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971). As one
commentator observed concerning the present-day employment of res ipsa loquitur:
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This presumptive theory notwithstanding, North Carolina case law has
held that res ipsa loquitur required that the defendant have maintained
control regarding the product.8 9
In the 1940 decision of Simpson v. American Oil Co.,90 the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that where the manufacturer expressly
warrants its product directly to the ultimate consumer, then privity is
irrelevant as a defense. 9 1 Unfortunately, the ruling in Simpson was
somewhat muddled by the Supreme Court into a rather narrow exception by the following statement in Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Prod. Dev. &
Sales, Co.9 2 which declared:
There is an exception to [the rule requiring privity between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer] where the warranty is addressed
to the ultimate consumer, and this exception has been limited to cases
involving sales of goods, intendedfor human consumption, in sealed packages prepared by the manufacturer
and having labels with representations
93
to consumers inscribed thereon.
It was not until 1979 that the Supreme Court's decision in Kinlaw
v. Long Mfg. Co.9 4 made clear Simpson's rule and its importance. Stating that the "rationale of Simpson was diluted in" Perfecting Service, the
Supreme Court in Kinlaw stated:
Our holding today simply reaffirms the vitality of Simpson.
Authority from most other jurisdictions holds that a purchaser who
relies upon a manufacturer's representations can recover for breach of
The expression, "res ipsa loquitur" is not heard much in recent products
cases and may not even be allowable in some jurisdictions, but
circumstantial evidence is commonly allowed to plaintiffs in cases where it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that there was something wrong
in the manufacture of a product. A typical example would be the "pop bottle"
case where a jury question may be raised by the fact of the bottle exploding
spontaneously, if it can be shown that a similar explosion had occurred
recently with another drink bottled by the same defendant. It should be
noted that this relaxation of the requirements of proof by the plaintiff does
not normally apply in design or warnings cases, being more appropriate to
manufacturing defects.
McQuade, supra note 7, at 12-13, (citing Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 44 S.E.2d
337 (N.C. 1947)).
89. Arrington v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 122, 124 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) ("We
hold that the original defendant did not retain control of the heater which makes res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable.").
90. 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
91. Id. at 816.
92. 136 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. 1964); see also Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at
178.
93. Perfecting Serv., 136 S.E.2d at 62-63. (emphasis added).
94. 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979); see also Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 178.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007

17

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:81

an express warranty despite lack of privity. The privity bound procedure whereby the purchaser claims against the retailer, the retailer
against the distributor, and the distributor, in turn, against the manufacturer, [citation omitted] is unnecessarily expensive and wasteful.
We find no reason to inflict this drain on the court's time and the
litigants' resources when there is an express warranty directed by its
terms to none other than the plaintiff purchaser.
Plaintiff has alleged an express warranty running directly to him,
breach of that warranty, and damages caused by the breach. The
absence of an allegation of privity between plaintiff and the
warrantor
95
in the sale of the warranted item is not fatal to the claim.
By 1979 most jurisdictions had adopted the strict liability doctrine regarding products liability. 9 6 Strict liability in products liability
- in essence means that the plaintiff only has to prove that his or her
injuries were proximately caused by a defective product in order to
recover - effectively ended the legal and mental gymnastics generally
necessary for an injured consumer to prevail upon a products liability
97
action sounded in negligence or warranty theory.
In 1944, the concept of strict liability in products liability was first
broached by Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,98 and later firmly
adopted, in 1960 and 1963 respectively, as the law of the land for New
Jersey and California by the decisions rendered in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield 99 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc.'oo As one commentator states:
Generally, under the doctrine of strict liability a manufacturer incurs
liability upon proof that he manufactured a defective and unreasonably
dangerous product which causes an injury while the product was
being used as the manufacturer intended. l 1 '
95. Kinlaw, 259 S.E.2d at 557; see also Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at
178 n.67 (stating, somewhat sardonically, that in Perfecting Service Company Justice
Moore "inaccurately" speaks of Simpson as having provided a limited exception to the
privity requirement for sale of goods "intended for human consumption, in sealed
packages" when, in fact, Simpson concerned a breach of warranty action involving an
insecticide.
96. See supra note 76.
97. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1696 ("The doctrine allows the trier of fact to
infer negligent conduct on the part of the manufacturer upon a showing that the
product was originally defective.").
98. 150 P.2d 436 (C.A. 1944).
99. 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
100. 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 (C.A. 1963).
101. Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 185 (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965)).
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The equity rationale underlying the widespread adoption of the
strict liability doctrine in products liability litigation was that the liability was simply part of a manufacturer's cost of doing business and
comports with the reasoning behind the enactment of workers' compensation. 102 Strict liability for a manufacturer was seen as logical
given that: it provided the manufacturer with an economic incentive to
take proper precautions for the public's safety, the mere fact that the
manufacturer placed the product into the marketplace was in effect an
implied warranty regarding the product's safety, and cost efficiency
dictated that the manufacturer was the party who was best situated to
discover and correct any defect or danger. 10 3 With the belief that strict
liability would enable consumers to more easily recover, with the additional benefit that manufacturers would redouble their efforts in consumer safety, jurisdictions adopted en mass strict liability pursuant to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.' °4
102. See Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 185-186; see also Justice Traynor's
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.:
...I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as
the basis of a plaintiffs right to recover in cases ...

In my opinion it should

now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings....
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to
life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is
evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against
the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from
defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an
injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to
the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless
find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the
responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer,
who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is
responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries
may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their
occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best
situated to afford such protection (citations omitted).
24 150 P.2d 436, 440 - 441 (C.A. 1944).
103. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1695.
104. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). § 402A ("Special Liability of
Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer") states as follows:
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The Pendulum Swings Back: Tort Reform Attempts to Stem the
Tide

During the 1970s and 1980s there came a recognition by many
that there existed a crisis within the insurance industry.' 0 5 In large
part, it was argued, the doctrine of strict liability provided injured con10 6
sumers an easier path to obtain recovery against manufacturers.
Moreover, interested parties, including manufacturers, wholesalers and
other business interests, argued that larger and larger recoveries seemingly went hand in hand with an increased success rate for plaintiffs, 10 7 including those involved in products liability actions.'0

8

Representatives for manufacturers and business advocates in general
decried this trend, arguing that such a climate would result in insurance companies raising their rates precipitously in response, and forcing many corporations to take into consideration a jurisdiction's
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.; see also McQuade, supra note 7, at 16-17.
105. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1689-90.
106. Id. at 1689-90.
107. See Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 171.
108. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1701. As it relates to the "insurance crisis," Mr.
Van Kirk offered, in part, the following:
In the 1970s, studies showed an alarming increase in both lawsuits and
recoveries. Product liability awards rose from approximately 143,000 in the
1960s to nearly 377,000 in the years between 1975 and 1979. Moreover, the
success rate and amount of damages awarded for product liability suits also
increased during this period. Not surprisingly, insurance rates rose rapidly.
These developments were attributed to a number of factors, including the
increased ability of attorneys in this area, the increased awareness of
consumers' rights, carelessness among consumers and manufacturers, and
changes in the tort system itself. In the face of such daunting statistics and
almost universal cries for tort reform, state legislatures sprang into action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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product liability laws in the preparation of their business plans. 0 9 As
one commentator stated:
In response to a perceived onslaught of frivolous lawsuits and skyrocketing damage awards, a tort reform movement has steadily spread
throughout the United States. . . . [S]tates have attempted to contain
the apparent litigation explosion ... with a wide array of legislation,
including damage caps and other changes in procedural and substantive law."to
Out of these concerns, "tort reform" was recognized as a movement and gained momentum.'
State legislative initiatives, such as
limits on recovery, statutes of repose governing products liability, and
modifying the plaintiffs burden of proof, were enacted." 2
C.

The Federal Response: Pre-Emption Lite

Concerns regarding the ever-increasing litigious nature of American society were not solely reflected in the halls of the various state
capitals. The federal government has had a long-term interest in tort
reform, including the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act" 3 in 1909 and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act in 1927."'
Contemporary federal initiative in the field of products liability
tort reform took the form of the Federal Interagency Task Force on
Product Liability ("Task Force"), under the control of the United States
109. See Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 171-72.
110. Matthew William Stevens, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments to
Chapter 99B, The Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2240 (1996) (footnotes
omitted).
111. See Van Kirk, supra note 77, at 1701-02.
112. See Henry Cohen and Nathan Brooks, Congressional Research Service Issue
Brief, Products Liability: A Legal Overview (June 3, 2005):
During the 1980s, in response to the liability insurance "crisis," many states
enacted tort reforms intended to limit the rights of injured parties. Some
states limited the right of plaintiff to sue product sellers other than the
manufacturer; some states permitted awards of punitive damages only upon
proof by "clear and convincing" evidence, or required that a portion of
punitive damages be paid to a state fund; some states enacted caps on
punitive damages or on non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering;
some states limited or eliminated joint and several liability or the collateral
source rule; and some enacted a statute of repose.
Id. at 6.
113. Victor E. Schwartz, White House Action on Civil Justice Reform: A Menu for the
New Millennium, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 393, 394 (2001) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 51 et
seq. (2000)).
114. Schwartz, supra note 110, at 394 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2000)).
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Department of Commerce.' 1 5 Acting between 1976 and 1980, during
the Carter and Ford administrations, the Task Force drafted the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act (MUPLA) to cure what it deemed the
problems for interstate commerce generated by the states' divergent
laws. 1 16 While many states adopted the MUPLA, the number was not
deemed sufficient to create a standardized statutory framework. 1 7 In
response, two House resolutions were introduced during the 96th Congress, but neither was enacted. 1 8 Although the MUPLA was not
enacted, Congress subsequently responded with industry-specific legislative reform as it deemed necessary.'1 9
D.

Strict Liability in North Carolina ...

Not!

Despite the foregoing two decades long trend favoring the adoption of the strict liability doctrine in products liability, North Carolina
arguably had not yet definitively embraced the doctrine by the time the
General Assembly enacted the state's Products Liability Act in 1979.120
In fact, even with the North Carolina General Assembly's passage of
the 1979 Products Liability Act, 1 2 1 some commentators remained
somewhat unclear whether, in products liability, strict liability was
1 22
available in North Carolina.
Clarity regarding the non-applicability of the strict liability doctrine in products liability was soon provided by North Carolina decisions in a string of cases beginning with Smith v. Fiber Controls
Corp.12 3 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., stated:
115. See COHEN & BROOKS, supra note 109, at 1.
116. See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 394.
117. See Id. at 394-95.
118. COHEN & BROOKS, supra note 109, at 2.
119. Schwartz, supra note 110, at 395 (citing General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994, Pub.L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 and Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519); see also Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185
(1999); National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3779; Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949.
120. See Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 76, at 185.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to 99B-11 (2005).
122. See Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 76, at 187.
123. 268 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1980); see also Bryant v. Adams, 448 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994); Warren v. Colombo, 377 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Holley v.
Burroughs Wellcome Co., 330 S.E.2d 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 348 S.E.2d 772
(N.C. 1986); Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 304 S.E.2d 773

(N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
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[W]e note that recent comprehensive legislation in this area by the
General Assembly does not adopt strict liability in product liability
cases. Significantly, the Products Liability Act specifically reaffirms the
applicability of contributory negligence as a defense in product liability actions. G.S. 99B-4(3). Suffice it to say, that given the recent legislative activity in this area, we are not presently inclined to consider
124
adoption of the rule of strict liability in product liability cases.
Shortly thereafter, in a case alleging damages resulting from defective tires and based upon negligence, breach of warranty and strict
liability, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina rendered its decision
in Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. The court
addressed the status of strict liability in North Carolina as it relates to
a products liability action by simply stating, "North Carolina does not
recognize this doctrine ....
2
In Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., a 1985 decision involving
allegations of negligence by the defendants regarding the marketing
and promotion of their products, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina addressed the inapplicability of the strict liability doctrine as
follows:
North Carolina does not recognize strict liability in products liability
actions. Therefore, whether defendants can be held liable in this case
must be determined in accordance with ordinary negligence principles. In order to establish a primafacie case of negligence on a products liability action, a party must show, "(1) evidence of a standard of
care owed by the reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances;
(2) breach of that standard of care; (3) injury caused directly or proximately by the breach, and; (4) loss because of the injury. "126
Thus, in North Carolina it is established law that a plaintiff may
recover for injuries based upon a manufacturer's negligence, 1 2 7 breach
29
of express warranty, 28 and breach of an implied warranty.
124. 268 S.E.2d 504, 509-10 (N.C. 1980) (internal citation omitted).
125. Byrd Motor Lines, Inc., 304 S.E.2d at 778.
126. Holley, 330 S.E.2d at 232 (citations omitted).
127. Jolley v. General Motors Corp., 285 S.E.2d 301, 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) ("In
an action to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of a manufacturer,
plaintiff must present evidence which tends to show that the product manufactured by
defendant was defective at the time it left defendant's plant, and that defendant was
negligent in its design of the product, in its selection of materials, in its assembly
process, or in its inspection of the product.") (citation omitted).
128. See Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 924, 929 (N.C. Ct. App.

1992).
129. Jolley, 285 S.E.2d at 303 ("To make out a case of breach of implied warranty,
the plaintiff must prove that the goods bought and sold were subject to an implied
warranty of merchantability, that the goods did not comply with the warranty in that
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- THE NORTH CAROLINA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT

While in 1979 the General Assembly neither expressly disavowed
the doctrine of strict liability in Chapter 99B 130 nor changed "substan13 1
tially either the traditional law of negligence or express warranty,"'
the North Carolina Products Liability Act was enacted with multiple
pro-business provisions providing manufacturers and merchants with
defenses against liability. The primary pro-business statutory decrees
involved: (1) section 99B-3(a) which relieved the manufacturer and
seller of any liability for any alteration or modification not done by
either of these two parties so long as the alteration or modification
were not done according to instructions or specifications or were not
performed with either the manufacturer's or seller's express consent; 132 (2) amending section 1-50 to include a six-year statute of
repose for "the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any
failure in relation to a product" as measured from the purchase
date; 133 and (3) perhaps of the greatest significance is section 99B-4,
which codified the doctrine of contributory negligence thereby reaffirming North Carolina's adherence to a conservative, pro-business
philosophy.

A.

13 4

The Implied Warranty of Merchantability

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English and
American jurisprudence integrated Roman law concerning the implied
13 5
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In the 1815 English case Gardiner v. Gray, the court stated:
[T]he purchaser has a right to expect a salable article answering the
description in the contract. Without any particular warranty, this is an
implied term in every such contract. When there is no opportunity to
inspect the commodity, the maxim of 'caveat emptor' does not apply. It
cannot, without a warranty insist that it shall be of any particular qualthe goods were defective at the time of sale, that his injury was caused by the defective
nature of the goods, and that damages were suffered as a result; the burden is upon the
purchaser to establish a breach by the seller of the implied warranty by showing that a
defect existed at the time of sale.") (citation omitted).
130. See Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 76, at 185 ("In North Carolina strict
liability remains an extremely confused area of products liability law.").
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id. at 175.
133. Id. at 196; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-52(16), 1-53(4) (2005) (containing
additional amendments added by the Act).
134. See Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 76, at 175.
135. McQuade, supra note 7, at 14.
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ity or fineness, but the intention of both parties must be taken to be
that it shall be salable in the market under the denomination mentioned in the contract between them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill.' 3 6
Citing to Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Gardiner v. Gray, the
commentator George Ross, in his 1855 treatise, Leading Cases in the
Commercial Law of England and Scotland, stated that Lord Ellenborough's proposition was that "without any particular warranty it is an
implied term in every contract, that the purchaser shall have a saleable
article answering the description in the contract ....
In the 1840 case Howard & Ryckman v. Hoey, the Supreme Court
of Judicature of New York commented upon the concept of
merchantability as follows:
[W]here there is a contract to deliver an article, e. g. a note for one
hundred bushels of wheat, merchantable or marketable quality is
always intended by the parties; such as would bring the average market
138
price at least.

A leading North Carolina decision regarding the implied warranty
of merchantability, W. F. Main Co. v. Fields,1 39 was rendered in 1907
and cited to Gardinerv. Gray, among other authorities, for the following propositions: (1) sales by sample involve an implied warranty that
the quality of the bulk of the goods equal that of the sample; 14 ° (2)
sales where the buyer purchases without an opportunity to inspect creates an implied warranty that the goods be at a minimum merchantable, meaning that they not be first or second quality, but that they are
not so inferior such that they are unsalable between dealers of the article;14 1 (3) selling a good creates a warranty of merchantability, meaning that it is fit for some purpose, as opposed to selling it for a
particularpurpose, which warrants it to be fit for that purpose; 14 2 (4)
136. Annotation, Implied condition or warranty of merchantability on sale of goods
without particular description or warranty, or present opportunity for inspection, 21
A.L.R. 367, 377 (1922) (quoting Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep.
46 (Nisi Prius)).
137. 2 GEORGE Ross, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF ENGLAND AND
SCOTLAND 231 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1855) (citing Gardiner v. Gray,
(1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (Nisi Prius)).
138. Howard & Ryckman v. Hoey, 23 Wend. 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (citation
omitted).
139. 56 S.E. 943 (N.C. 1907).
140. Id. at 944 (citing BENJAMIN ON SALES, 683).
141. Fields, 56 S.E. at 944 (citing BENJAMIN ON SALES, 686) (first emphasis in
original).
142. Id. at 311, citing Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 544.
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in sales involving the lack of any particular warranty, a buyer expects
an implied right to a "salable article answering the description in the
contract"; 14 3 (5) merchantable means that the article not have any
"remarkable defect";' 4 4 and (6) an article shall be merchantable if it is
145
to be manufactured and delivered in the future.
Another early North Carolina case concerning the implied warranty of merchantability was Asheford v. H. C. Schrader Co. 146 The
case concerned a dispute between orange dealers in which the plaintiff
asserted that the oranges sold to him by the defendant were substantially rotten and unfit for sale. 1 47 The North Carolina Supreme Court
held that an implied warranty of merchantability means that the goods
1' 48
must at least be "salable.'

The North Carolina Supreme Court in Aldridge Motors, Inc. v.
Alexander,'4 9 quoted Swift & Co. v. Aydlett,' 5 ° for the proposition that
the doctrine of implied warranty should be extended as it relates to
sales of personal property,15 1 and then opined that exacting applications of caveat emptor had become incompatible with contemporary
business transactions. The court then held that the doctrine of
implied warranty was "more in accord with the principle that 'honesty
is the best policy' and that both vendor and vendee, by fair exchange of
'52
values, profit by a sale."'
In 1965, the State of North Carolina adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 53 As such, the Supreme Court of North Carolina holds
that the Uniform Commercial Code governs implied warranty claims
in actions based upon products liability.' 5 4 Section 25-2-314 of the
143. Id. at 944 (quoting Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Campb. 144 (English 1815)).
144. Id. at 944 (quoting McClung v. Kelley, 21 Iowa 508 (1866)).
145. Id. at 944 (citing Gaylord Mfg. Co. v. Allen, 53 N. Y. 515 (1873)).
146. 83 S.E. 29 (N.C. 1914).
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id. at 31.
149. 9 S.E.2d 469 (N.C. 1940).
150. 135 S.E. 141 (N.C. 1926).
151. Aldridge Motors, Inc., 9 S.E.2d at 472 (citing Swift & Co., 135 S.E. at 143).
152. Id. at 472.
153. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to 25-11-108 (1965).
154. See Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 854 (N.C. 1988) ... actions for
breach of implied warranty are now governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
adopted in North Carolina in 1965 as chapter 25 of the General Statutes. The Uniform
Commercial Code applies to warranty claims in products liability actions.") (citing
Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 354 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1987); Bernick v. Jurden, 293
S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1982); Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 571 F.Supp. 433
(M.D.N.C. 1983)).
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107

North Carolina General Statutes concerns the implied warranty of
merchantability, and states as follows:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (G.S. 25-2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under
this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (G.S. 25-2-316) other implied
warranl
ties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.' 5
B.

Chapter 99B Codification of Contributory Negligence

The General Assembly's 1979 enactment of § 99B-4 11 6 codified a
general "catch-all" provision for the doctrine of contributory negli155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (1965); see also Reid v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc.,
253 S.E.2d 344, 349 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("In its pure form, an action for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability under G.S. § 25-2-314 (and all other analogous
state enactions of U.C.C. 2-314) entitles a plaintiff to recover without any proof of
negligence on a defendant's part where it is shown that (1) a merchant sold goods, (2)
the goods were not "merchantable" at the time of sale, (3) the plaintiff (or his
property) was injured by such goods, (4) the defect or other condition amounting to a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability proximately caused the injury, and
(5) the plaintiff so injured gave timely notice to the seller.").
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 as enacted in 1979 states as follows:
Knowledge or reasonable care.
No manufacturer or seller shall be held liable in any product liability action
if:

(1) The use of the product giving rise to the product liability action was
contrary to any express and adequate instructions or warnings delivered
with, appearing on, or attached to the product or on its original container or
wrapping, if the user knew or with the exercise of reasonable and diligent
care should have known of such instructions or warnings; or
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gence as it relates to a products liability action filed by an injured consumer, along with two fact specific provisions concerning the
consumer's contributory negligence. 157 Thus, § 99B-4 statutorily
extended a common law affirmative defense based in tort law to a
cause of action grounded in contract. While Chapter 99B not only
remained silent to the issue of strict liability, it explicitly reaffirmed
the State's commitment to the doctrine of contributory negligence.
Thus, it is not surprising that by 1979, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals stated the following:
It is now generally acknowledged that the action for breach of warranty is an offspring of mixed parentage, aspects of it sounding in both
tort and contract, but following strictly the rules and precedents of
neither. 158

In 1995, the North Carolina General Assembly made plain its
intent regarding the inapplicability of strict liability in products liability actions when it amended Chapter 99B, 15 9 in part, by enacting
§ 99B-1.1 which stated the following: "There shall be no strict liability
in tort in product liability actions." 160 In addition to expressly
rejecting strict liability, the General Assembly set the requirements for
what must be proven by the plaintiff in order to succeed upon claims
involving either (1) inadequate warning or instruction, 16 1 or (2) inade62
quate design or formulation. 1

The General Assembly also amended Chapter 99B by enacting
§ 99B-1.2 which expressly stated that nothing in the Act amending
Chapter 99B would prohibit a products liability action for breach of
warranty, in addition to stating that the defenses provided for in the
Chapter would apply to warranty actions unless the Chapter expressly
excluded them. It is suggested by one commentator that there may
have been concern that warranty actions could be considered as being
(2) The user knew of or discovered a defect or dangerous condition of
the product that was inc'onsistent with the safe use of the product, and then
unreasonably and voluntarily exposed himself or herself to the danger, and
was injured by or caused injury with that product; or
(3) The claimant failed to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances in the use of the product, and such failure was a proximate
cause of the occurrence that caused the injury or damage complained of.
157. See Blanchard and Abrams, supra note 76, at 176.
158. Reid v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 253 S.E.2d 344, 347 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
159. See 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 522.
160. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (1995); see also Stevens, supra note 107, at 2246.
161. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5 (1995).
162. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (1995).
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excluded from Chapter 99B given1 63the amended Act's emphasis on negligence actions versus warranty.
III.

RECENT CASE LAW CONCERNING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
ACTING AS A BAR TO A CLAIM ALLEGING BREACH OF THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY

Upon passage of § 99B-4, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in
the 1989 case of Steelcase, Inc. v. Lilly Co., Inc., rendered a decision on
the statute's applicability in a products liability action, based upon the
Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 1 6 4 The defendant had allegedly supplied wood stains to
plaintiff which, upon application, allegedly caused plaintiffs furniture
to discolor. 165 The plaintiff, a furniture maker, alleged breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, negligence, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. 1 66 The
defendant asserted, among other defenses, the plaintiffs contributory
negligence. 167
When the trial court submitted the issues to the jury, such issues
did not touch upon whether the defendant had breached the implied
warranty of merchantability. 1 68 Instead, as to the issue of breach of an
implied warranty, the issues submitted to the jury only addressed the
alleged breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
9
purpose.

16

As it relates to the alleged breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, the defendant in Steelcase successfully argued
that the plaintiffs claim was in actuality a products liability action, and
that § 99B-4(1), 170 which concerns the plaintiffs contributory negligence as it relates to the product's instructions or warnings, acted to
preclude the plaintiff from recovering as a matter of law upon any
163. See Stevens, supra note 107, at 2256.
164. 379 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
165. Id. at 41.
166. Id. at 42.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1979) ("No manufacturer or seller shall be held
liable in any product liability action if: (1) [t]he use of the product giving rise to the
product liability action was contrary to any express and adequate instructions or
warnings delivered with, appearing on, or attached to the product or on its original
container or wrapping, if the user knew or with the exercise of reasonable and diligent
care should have known of such instructions or warnings .... ").
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implied warranty. 17 1 Given that the jury had answered in the affirmative upon the issue of whether the plaintiff had used the stain "contrary to any express and adequate instructions . . . [which plaintiff]
knew or with the exercise of reasonable and diligent care should have
known," the Appellate Court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the implied warranty issue, but
denied it concerning the breach of contract claim, reasoning that
72
Chapter 99B did not apply to plaintiff's breach of contract claim.'
In Westover Products, Inc. v. Gateway Roofing Co., 17 3 the Court of
Appeals for the first time directly addressed the applicability of § 99B-4
to a cause of action based upon the breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. 1 74 The matter involved the installation of a roof system in the construction of a building. 7 ' There, a third-party defendant cross-claimed against a fellow third-party defendant by alleging
negligence and breach of the express and implied warranties. 1 76 The
Court of Appeals held that section 99B-4 (1) would have applied to bar
the cross-claim's plaintiff from recovery had not the cross-claim defendant obligated itself to instruct the cross-claim's plaintiff on installation procedures, and in fact, also assisted the cross-claim's plaintiff in
7
the installation.

17

The North Carolina Supreme Court directly addressed the applicability of section 99B-4 to a cause of action based upon the breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability in its 1992 decision, Goodman
v. Wenco Foods, Inc.17 8 The matter arose from the plaintiff customer
allegedly being injured by a bone while eating a hamburger which was
served by the co-defendant restaurantand containing meat supplied by the
79
co-defendant meat supplier.1
The defendant meat supplier asserted, in part, that § 99B-4 (1)and
(3) entitled it to summary judgment on the issue of implied breach of
merchantability.'8 0 Of particularnote, the Supreme Court in Goodman
171. Steelcase, 379 S.E.2d at 42-43.
172. Id. at 43.
173. 380 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
174. Id. at 374.
175. Id. at 371.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 374.
178. 423 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1992).
179. Id. at 446.
180. Id. at 456-57 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1)-(3) (2005)). Subsection (3) is
§ 99B-4's catchall provision to bar a plaintiff from recovery in a products liability
action arising from the plaintiffs contributory negligence, and reads as follows: "The
claimant failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in the use of the
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cited to its prior decision in Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.' 8 1 in
which it concluded that:
"[A]n action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under
the Uniform Commercial Code is a 'product liability action' within the
meaning of the Products Liability Act if ...the action is for injury to
person or property resulting from a sale of a product .... [11n products
liability actions arising from breaches of implied warranties ...the

defenses provided by N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(a) [concerning seller's lack of
opportunity1 8 to
inspect as relieving liability] are available to
2
defendants."'

The Supreme Court then asserted in Goodman that "[ilt follows
that defendants may avail themselves of defenses provided elsewhere
83
1
in the Products Liability Act."'

Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that (1) the implied
breach of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code was
within the purview of Chapter 99B only if the action is for injury to
person or property resulting from a sale of the product, thereby requiring injury to person or property other than that of the product sold;
and (2) that all defenses found in Chapter 99B were available to potentially preclude such a claim for the breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. ' 4
In Morgan v. CavalierAcquisition Corp.,18 a 1993 court of appeals
decision, in which an action was filed based upon negligence, breach
of implied warranty and strict liability, involving a plaintiff suffering
fatal injuries from a vending machine falling upon him.'8 6 The Court
of Appeals ruled that it was a products liability action because it had
been brought due to a death caused by or resulting from the "manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of standards,
preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning,
instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging, or labeling" of a
product.' 8 7
While citing Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.' 8 8 for the proposition that an action for the breach of an implied warranty of
product, and such failure was a proximate cause of the occurrence that caused the
injury or damage complained of." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (3) (2005).
181. Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 354 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1987).
182. Id. at 498-99.
183. Goodman, 423 S.E.2d at 456.
184. Id. at 457
185. 423 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
186. Id. at 524.
187. Id. at 527 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 (3) (2005)).
188. Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 354 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1987).
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merchantability involving injury to a person resulting from the sale of
product is a products liability action,' 8 9 the Court of Appeals in Morgan determined, in part, that the record could not support summary
judgment for the defendants based upon § 99B-4 even though the
defendants' evidence included expert witness testimony that the vending machine was in proper working condition, had been set up properly, and that it was close to inconceivable that the machine could have
fallen without someone deliberately tipping it over. 190
In Bryant v. Adams, 19 1 the Court of Appeals held, in part, that
there were genuine issues of material fact which precluded summary
judgment for the defendants as to the issue of the plaintiffs contributory negligence under § 99B-4 (1) and (3).192 The plaintiff, having suffered catastrophic injuries on a trampoline resulting in his
quadriplegia,' 93 brought a products liability action based upon claims
of negligence and breach of express and implied warranties. 19 4 The
claim stemmed from defendants' alleged negligent failure to properly
or sufficiently warn of the trampoline's dangers, breach of express and
19 5
implied warranties and strict liability.
In reversing the trial court's order dismissing the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, the Court of Appeals in Bryant cited Champs Convenience Stores v. United Chemical Co. 196 for the proposition that "if the
instructions themselves were not adequate or if the plaintiff did not
read the instructions but the jury determined that the plaintiff still
exercised reasonable care, a plaintiff should not be found contribu1' 97
torily negligent.'
The last North Carolina Supreme Court case directly addressing
§ 99B-4 barring a claim based upon a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability was Nicholson v. American Safety Utility Corp.198
The litigation involved an electrical lineman who was electrocuted of
by an energized line resulting in severe injuries from which he filed a
product liability action based upon claims of negligence and breach of
warranty against several defendants, including both the manufacturer
189.
190.
191.
192.

Morgan, 423 S.E.2d at 919.
Id. at 922-23.
448 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 845.

193. Id. at 835.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
406 S.E.2d 856 (N.C. 1991).
Bryant, 448 S.E.2d at 845.
488 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. 1997).
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and the seller of the gloves which the plaintiff was wearing at the time
of the accident.1 9 9 The trial court granted these defendants' motion
for summary judgment based, in part, upon the finding that the plaintiff was contributory negligent as a matter of law. 20 ' The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment
for the defendant seller on the issue of implied warranty and to both
defendants on the issue of expressed warranty, but reversed the trial
court as to the issues of plaintiff's contributory negligence, the defendants' negligence, and the defendant manufacturer's alleged breach of
the implied warranty. 20 1 The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals' reversal of summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants on the issues of plaintiff's contributory negligence, defendants'
negligence, and the manufacturer's breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.

20 2

However, in affirming, the Supreme Court in Nicholson found that
the Court of Appeals' reading of § 99B-4 (3) - limiting the defense 20to3
the misuse of the product by the plaintiff - was too narrowly drawn.
The Supreme Court cited to its prior decision in Champs Convenience
Stores for the rule that § 99B-4 simply codifies for product liability
actions the common law doctrine of contributory negligence in addition to providing specialized fact patterns which would amount to contributory negligence by the plaintiff in a products liability action; in
essence, § 99B-4 (3) did not provide a different rule, but simply a20 clari4 Of
fication of the doctrine as it relates to product liability actions.
particular note, the Supreme Court further stated that the plaintiff's
use of the product was not the focus of the statute but instead, "all of
the circumstances during the plaintiff's use of the product must be
considered, not just plaintiff's conduct with respect to the product
20 5

itself."

Following Nicholson, the Court of Appeals has twice revisited the
doctrine of contributory negligence acting as a bar to a plaintiff's product liability claim based upon the breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.

199. Id. at 241-42.

200.
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204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 243.

at 241, 244-45
at 243-44.
at 244.
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In its 2001 decision, Dewitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 2 ° 6 a matter
involving a leaking battery causing injury to the plaintiff, the Court of
Appeals addressed, in part, the issue of whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent thereby barring his claim against a battery manufacturer for its alleged breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.2 °7 Finding that the record was bereft of any evidence
that plaintiff knew that the moisture on his sock was from the defendant's leaking batteries, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, explaining that
it could not hold as matter of law that, under the circumstances, "an
ordinarily prudent person" would be conscious he had come into contact with battery fluid or even if known, would have taken immediate
action to remove the fluid.2 °8
The 2003 Court of Appeals decision rendered in Swain v. Preston
Fall East, L.L. C. 2 0 9 involved an action alleging negligence, breach of
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose, negligent misrepresentation, gross negligence, unfair and
deceptive practices, and negligence per se. 2 10 The claims were made
by the plaintiff in connection with, in part, the alleged negligent selection and application or supervision of synthetic stucco to the plaintiffs
townhouse. 2 1 1 Although the decision did not expressly state that the

action was grounded in products liability law, the basic gravamen of
plaintiffs action appears to be that defendants had negligently selected
and applied defectively designed synthetic stucco which had caused
moisture damage to the townhouse, and which would need to be
replaced or further damage would be incurred.2 1 2
The Court of Appeals in Swain affirmed the trial court entry of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs had notice of problems with the synthetic stucco prior to their
purchase such that it gave rise to a duty to properly inspect the property, and that by not doing so, the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent as a matter of law.21 3

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

550 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002).
DeWitt, 550 S.E.2d at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
576 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703-04.
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CONCLUSION

One view of contributory negligence, widely held by those who
are members of the plaintiffs bar, is that the doctrine is "antiquated
and unfair" and should be rejected in favor of comparative fault.2 14 An
opposite view held by many, especially those advocates representing
North Carolina commercial interests, asserts that a "change would...
hurt the favorable business climate in our state. 2 1 5
Whether one views the doctrine of contributory negligence with
favor or chagrin, it should be recognized that in order to obtain the
political support necessary in the General Assembly to enact legislation abrogating the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of
comparative fault, the doctrine of joint and several liability would quite
likely be abolished as a statutory quid pro quo.216 Thus, those who
demand that North Carolina join the vast majority of jurisdictions who
have adopted comparative fault may benefit from a realistic cost-benefit analysis regarding the benefits of comparative fault measured
against the detriments attendant with an abolition of joint and several
liability. Moreover, the doctrine of contributory negligence serves as a
rational and legitimate statutory buffer against, and disincentive for,
the filing of frivolous suits, resulting in greater public confidence as a
whole in the State of North Carolina's legal system
The foregoing analysis notwithstanding, North Carolina has steadfastly maintained its allegiance to the doctrine of contributory negligence and affirmed the doctrine with its codification in the North
Carolina Products Liability Act. North Carolina has not only expressly
confirmed the applicability of the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence to products liability claims based on the negligent acts and
omissions of the manufacturer and seller, the State has also rejected
strict liability in tort in product liability actions. Perhaps of greatest
significance is the statutory extension by North Carolina of the doctrine of contributory negligence to products liability actions based in
warranty law, thus signaling its steadfast support for the doctrine. The
214. North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, 2005-2006 Legislative Agenda,
http://ncatl.org/?p=17559 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
215. Joseph Menn, Many Claims Face Delays, Other Hurdles, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Feb. 9, 1992, at 7C (quoting Phil Kirk, past president of the N.C. Citizens for Business
and Industry).
216. See e.g. Bill Requesting Study of Contributory Negligence Gets Favorable Report,
NCMS BULL. (N.C. MED. Soc'y, Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 2007 at 2 ("Any debate about
repealing contributory negligence will spark discussion of repealing or attenuating
joint and several liability."), available at http://ncmedsoc.org/bulletins/
ViewNewsletter?newsletterid=237.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007

35

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8

116

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:81

practitioner's ability to assert the doctrine of contributory negligence
as an affirmative defense to a claim based upon the breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability implicitly recognizes this State's
continuing acceptance and belief in the policy underpinnings of the
doctrine.
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